… continuation of A. A Unified theory for Everything? (Pt. 1)
A. A Unified theory for Everything? (Pt. 2)
An important facet of Küng's argument against the sort of scientific 'over-confidence' that jumps in bed with logical-positivism and consequently marginalizes anything theological, draws on the work of Karl Popper. In particular, he addresses the claim that everything metaphysical must be delimited as 'meaningless' by justifiably asking: "Ist es legitim, bestimmte Fragen von vornherein als »sinnlos« auszuschließen, wenn man empirisch-mathematisch gar nicht definieren kann, was »Sinn« überhaupt ist?" ("Is it legitimate to bracket certain questions, right from the beginning, as 'meaningless', when it is not possible to define what 'meaning' is at all from a mathematical-empirical standpoint?") (42). Science, indeed, can never prove its statements in an absolute sense. They, according to Popper, can only be falsified! Science has its limits.
None of this is to be understood as an attack on the whole scientific approach, however. Rather, Küng's objective in this first chapter is to blunt the unrealistic self-assurance and philosophical naivety of its logical-positivist infected branches. Küng wants to emphasise that Reality cannot be defined 'von vornherein' ('from the start') by some kind of absolutised Rationalität. Reality is multifaceted and complex beast that is best approached through a variety of means employing a variety of methods, though each be very different. Not only that, but it is clear that no one operates from a detached Spock-like rationality, but has desires, feelings, intuition, fantasy, emotion and passion. Again, this is not meant as an argument against rationality, only the absolutisation of it.
Science and theology, he suggest, are both legitimate perspectives with which to analyse the complex of reality. However, just as he pressed in relation to the natural science and mathematics, theology also cannot claim to own the Truth 'von vornherein' absolutely. Theologians too must always be prepared to revise old models and think new thoughts. In particular, they shouldn't withdraw to the alleged infallibility of the Pope, Bible or any creedal-pronouncements of the Church. Rather, science and theology can work together over the question of Reality, something that the schools of Barth (and his aversion to 'natural theology' [three cheers for Brunner!]) and Bultmann (and his neglect of cosmology through his preoccupation with human Existenz) have generated a need for. And theologians must be careful to note that this working together should most certainly not flip into a defensive apologetic stance. On the other hand, instead of a pure integration of science and theology, Küng suggests a complementary relationship. Following Kant he affirms that science has its focus on space-time phenomena, but cannot overstep this world of phenomena. The world "in-itself", the questions concerning the ground and meaning of Reality as a whole, are beyond just science and mathematics.
In the next section, Küng will attempt to employ this 'complementary model' as he bores deeper into the question of the mathematical structure of the physical world.
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3 comments:
Kung seems to be tackling these issues head on which is encouraging.
If we can formulate scientific theories on the basis of empirical evidence (even in spite of the limitation of science to prove something), from what evidence do we formulate our theologies?
In answering this question does metaphysical enquiry have a lesser significance in defining and exploring reality than the scientific approach?
Do you think Kung overplays this point:
Science, indeed, can never prove its statements in an absolute sense.
Although this is true, science still offers a sound investigatable and falsifiable explanation whereas metaphysics could be left in the realm of pure speculation?
Are theology and science equal endevours in the attempt to give an account of reality? Is one subserviant to the other etc?
There you go mate...some thoughts!
There is no denying scientific overconfidence as of late, and I'm glad Küng has brought it up. I agree, however, with thelostmessage's hesitance to accept the following as surely true: "Science, indeed, can never prove its statements in an absolute sense." I guess I would like to know what "absolute" means here, if not irreformable? Sure, it is true that the natural sciences are limited to their own methods, but I hardly see that that makes them incapable of proving some things via their own methods. But, perhaps he's just reduced Popper to saying "we can only falsify, never prove," and then run with that?
This statement, "Reality is multifaceted and complex beast that is best approached through a variety of means employing a variety of methods, though each be very different," is very good. And in some way, I think it might make better sense of the Küng quote above, regarding the limitations of the natural sciences. But, I also think that this is just the point. We do approach aspects of reality according to the method appropriate to the aspect under investigation. Insofar as things are quantifiable, we use math. Insofar as things are in locomotion, we use physics. Insofar as man in interacting with other rational animals, we use sociology. But, I think the point is that we are actually coming to *know* (in which case we're dealing with truth and proofs) these various aspects of reality through the employment of these various methods.
Also, perhaps the days are gone for thinking of theology as the "Queen of the Sciences," but we still would not do too well to put her merely on a par with the other sciences, if for no other reason than that her Object is Infinite Being, clearly superior to the object of any other science.
Two final thoughts. "Theologians too must always be prepared to revise old models and think new thoughts," is a statement with which I don't think any theologians (Catholic or Protestant) would disagree. Is he arguing against someone in particular here?
Also, "In particular, they shouldn't withdraw to the alleged infallibility of the Pope, Bible or any creedal-pronouncements of the Church," seems a bit strong. If nothing could be thought of as infallible in the whole Christian Tradition, then what would be the point of theology? How would one ever know that he has ascertained something true in his theological investigations, with nothing whatsoever as considered infallible on which he could fall back?
There you go homey...([African]American for "mate")...some more food for indigestible thoughts.
Thanks for these very thought-provoking points chaps. And because they open up such massive areas of dialogue I thought it would be best to try and address your questions (that I myself am asking) as I go through my overview of Küng.
So, Jeremiah and Simon, keep an eye on the future Küng Anfang Aller Dinge posts and see if he or I address the questions as you have raised satisfactorily.
Again, many thanks for these comments. Its an absolutely fascinating area of debate don't you think?!
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